The new Rural Development Regulation of the EU reflects the shift of attention within rural areas from agricultural production towards rural development and embraces both, farmers and non-farm residents. While agricultural production is required to comply with environmental standards, rural areas also have to fulfil the growing demand for landscape, outdoor recreation and wildlife conservation. This paper develops a model of a rural area where farmers and non-farm residents live together. A central government uses a combination of two-policy instruments--direct compensation payments and public services --aimed at encouraging farmers to adopt environmentally beneficial practices and at the same time to increase the provision of country-side amenities and the sustained vitality of the rural area. The optimal mix of the policy instruments is evaluated under various governmental objectives. The analysis suggests that a combination of direct payments to farmers with the supply of local public services is a promising tool for rural policy development initiatives in the EU.
Introduction
In the European Union (EU), rural areas are confronted with various changes, affecting economic activity, landscape and the environment. At different policy levels, forces can be observed that entail a shift from agricultural production towards the environment and rural development. Considering these forces, there seems to be a need for an integrated rural policy development.
Since agricultural activity covers 50.5 % of the total territory of the EU (Brouwer and Lowe, 2000) , changes in the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will entail important implications for rural areas. The MacSharry reform of the CAP in 1992, including the agri-environmental policy Regulation 2078/92, implies a reduction of support prices to balance the markets while compensating income losses caused by reductions in output and/or increases in costs related to environmental beneficial farming. In recent years, agri-environmental policy has been placed at the forefront of a far wider debate concerning the future of rural, and not just agricultural, Europe. The Cork Declaration of 1996 gave particular emphasis to the role of environmental friendly forms of agriculture in contributing to sustainable rural economic development (Buller, 2000) .
Measures to promote agricultural and rural development and the management of the countryside are further consolidated and made subject to a new decentralised programming procedure under the new Rural Development Regulation 1257/99 which forms the basis for a rural development policy (the "second pillar" of the CAP). This new rural development policy embraces both farm and non-farm developments as well as agri-environmental measures and forestry. An important feature of Regulation 1257/99 is that considerable discretion is left to the individual member states, which allows taking into account the diversity of rural conditions and circumstances. Moreover, while being co-financed from the CAP Guarantee Fund 1 , the rural development policy is horizontal (covering all rural areas) and allows the integration of agrienvironmental measures with both farming and non-farming activities (article 33 of the Regulation).
In the run-up to new trade negotiations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the changing role of agriculture is often indicated by multi-functionality. In the EU, multi-functionality highlights various non-trade concerns acknowledging that agriculture, in addition to the marketable production of food and fibre, generates other goods and services to which society attaches a value (Burrell, 2001) . Since it can be expected that within the framework of WTO negotiations, to an increasing extent agricultural (rural) support measures will be de-coupled from agricultural production, the scope for support of non-agricultural activities increases.
In addition to the changing international and EU policy environment, also at a regional level the attention for rural areas increases. While agricultural production methods are required to be in accordance with environmental standards, rural areas also have to fulfil the growing demand by non-farmer residents, both at a national and regional level, concerning outdoor recreation and tourism, nature and wildlife conservation, and landscape. The demand for these goods tends to increase with income, mobility and leisure time and also depends on attitudes and fashion. 2 Although some of these goods are provided by rural entrepreneurs, others have obvious public good characteristics which requires public intervention (Curry, 1994 ).
Given the above described shift of attention within rural areas from agricultural production towards the environment and rural development, there is a need for a new pallet of agrienvironmental instruments to achieve an integrated rural policy. Despite increased interest for rural development policies, until recently there has been little economic analysis of rural policy issues (Freshwater, 1997) .
3 In this paper we develop a model of a rural area where farmers and non-farm residents live together, while a central government initiates a voluntary agri-environmental program for the provision of a minimum required area of low intensity farming. The government provides incentives to participating farmers, to compensate the reduced profits associated with the shift to low intensity farming. Under different governmental objectives, we evaluate the optimal mix of two different policy instruments: a compensation payment per hectare and government services to develop activities based on low intensity farming like recreation and landscape activities or the production of regional and "environmentally friendly" products. Explicit attention is paid to the fact that also non-farm residents may benefit from such an integrated rural policy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the conceptual framework of the model and elaborates on comparative statics with respect to relevant parameters. Section 3 defines the target participation level of the program and derives the cost minimising choice of policy instruments. Section 4 considers the optimal set of policy instruments under three alternative governmental objective functions: a farmer oriented objective, a non-farm residents oriented objective and an integrated rural policy objective. Finally, Section 5 summarises the results and draws conclusions.
Conceptual Framework
Consider a rural area (hereafter, a region), H hectares (ha) of which are environmentally sensitive farmland. The rest of the area is populated by N identical non-farm residents (NFRs). Agricultural production is profitable but associated with environmental damage that can be reduced via the adoption of conservation practices (like conversion of arable land to extensive grassland, reducing application of fertilisers and pesticides) and/or removal of land from agricultural production (set-aside). To simplify the analysis we will not distinguish between these two alternatives and refer to land used for "low intensity farming" (LIF). Farmers would commonly not apply low intensity practices voluntarily, because it will decrease profits. Some (but not all) of the reduction in profits can be recovered by the production of environment dependent products which are related to the LIF area (hereafter defined as LIF 2 The recent outbreak of the foot and mouth disease in some European countries also caused considerable damage in the tourism and recreation industry which demonstrates the existing interdependencies between recreation, tourism and rural areas. 3 Exceptions are Brunstad et al. (1999) , Weaver (1998) and Latacz-Lohmann (1998) who pay attention to the provision of public goods by farmers. These contributions, however, do not take into account the integrated development of rural areas which include both farmers and NFRs. Studies from other disciplines, like sociology, seem to be less scarce (e.g. Falconer, 2000; Lowe and Ward, 1998; Slee et al., 1997; and Gasson, 1988) . 4 Typical current examples of LIF are the German market release and landscape conservation programs and the Dutch environmental management agreements (e.g. Kazenwadel et al.,1998) . activities). Examples of such LIF activities are farm-based recreation and landscape activities (like farm parks and shops, farm trails, rooms for rent, camping and increased bio-diversity) or the production of regional and "environmentally friendly" products which can be indicated through labelling, certification and place of origin (Legg, 2000) . The provision of LIF activities contributes to the welfare of the region's NFRs as well as to the welfare of tourists who choose to visit the area or consumers who spend money on LIF activities (e.g. labelled products). However, we assume that in the absence of public intervention, intensive agriculture is more profitable than LIF and therefore, the latter will not be adopted. Moreover, we assume that it is not profitable to develop LIF activities on land that is fully utilised for intensive arable agriculture.
Policy Instruments
To encourage farmers to adopt LIF practices, the government offers them to participate in an environmental-friendly regulation program (ERP) under which a per-hectare direct compensation payment of s Euros is paid for each hectare enrolled in the program. In the current analysis, the direct payment s addresses both the positive and the negative externalities farmers generate upon society. Namely, it may be viewed as a compensation payment for the use of less-profitable environmentally beneficial farming practices and at the same time as a subsidy for the provision of countryside amenities.
In addition to a direct payment, the government may encourage participation in the ERP and provision of LIF activities by providing services denoted by g.
5 All farmers enrolling the ERP have access to these services. Unlike direct payments, supply of government services may also have direct positive spillover effects on the welfare of non-farmers who reside in the rural area. Examples of government services relevant for our analysis include investment in basic infrastructure like roads, information gathering and disseminating, help in legal privatisation of access rights for recreation activities at the regional and farm-level, co-ordination between farmers aimed at increasing the overall attraction of the region for farm-based tourism (Ilbery et al., 1998) , lowering the transaction costs to participate in the ERP, labelling, advertising and marketing plans and more (see Curry, 1994 and Legg, 2000) . Also government services may be required to deal with institutional issues like charging for public goods (Curry, 1994, ch. 9) or transforming environmental/public goods into market goods (Merlo et al., 2000) .
Obviously, the government should choose s and g jointly, taking into account the interactions between the impacts of the two policy instruments on the welfare of farmers and non-farmers residing in the rural area under consideration. In the absence of an explicit spatially-variable pollution production function, the negative environmental externalities associated with agricultural production are taken care of via a rural-level participation restriction in the ERP. Specifically, the governmental choice of g and s should ensure the participation of a minimum predetermined aggregate land area, say r H ha, in the ERP. The determination of r H is based on country-level environmental considerations that are exogenous to our analysis.
Farmers' Behaviour
We start the formal analysis with farmer's decisions under the voluntary ERP. The agricultural land is owned by a large number of farmers, say M, with farmer m owning h m hectares, . Farmers in the region possess identical production skills and technologies, but they vary with respect to their land endowment, land productivity and environmental characteristics. m represent labour unit per ha devoted for LIF and agricultural activities, respectively. For the sake of simplicity we assume that each of these two labour units is predetermined at the level required for best management practice. The per unit cost of farmer labour is denoted by w (the off-farm reservation wage for example). H are not expected to affect the production technology of LIF at the farm level. They make the rural area more attractive as a whole, however, and as a result increase consumers' demand for LIF activities like recreation and landscape activities (for empirical examples of such spillover effects see Merlo et al., 2000, Hackl and Pruckner, 1997) . Explicit analysis of consumers' demand for LIF activities is out of the scope of the current paper.
Formally, benefits B (excluding labour costs) on farm m from LIF activities can be described by the following additive separable function:
where V is monotonically increasing, twice differentiable and concave -
The sign of the third derivative of V is dependent on the specific assumed functional form. Here we assume that a good approximation of can be obtained by employing a second order Taylor expansion about , which implies
Hence, the assumptions on (1) imply that the marginal benefit of LIF activities is a positive, monotonically decreasing function of , while an increase in g and/or m r r H imply a parallel upward shift of this function. The shift function f is monotonically increasing, twice differentiable and concave in both arguments, which are assumed to be complements, for any and any 0 > g r H which exceeds some lower bound of, say, H hectares. Formally,
For simplicity and without loss of generality, the marginal benefit (excluding labour costs) of land devoted to intensive agricultural production is assumed to be fixed at a level of v m Euros/ha. Likewise, a negative spill-over effect of r H , e.g. in case of tourism, may be valid for agricultural activities (Vail and Hultkrantz, 2000) . Here we assume both effects to be negligible and hence it can be omitted from the analysis without loss of generality. H is treated as a fixed parameter in the farm-level optimisation problem.
7 Assuming for simplicity that at the optimum , the first order condition is: are the opportunity costs. Hence, equation (3) suggest that farmers will enrol land in the ERP until the marginal net benefit of an additional hectare is zero. This also implies that all hectares of a given farm that participate in the program but the last marginal one, receives a surplus. Hence, the ERP entails positive profits for participating farmers. Note also from (3) that farmers for whom ), is much larger than m~m e Since we assume that all farmers have identical skills, most likely this should be related to variation of spatial productivity among farmers (farms too remote from tourists/consumers, farms located in an unattractive environment, etc.).
Assuming an internal solution and conducting comparative statics with (3) gives the impact of the different parameters on . The results in (5) will be utilised in the next section.
Non-farm Residents
Recall that in addition to farmers, the rural area is assumed to be populated by N identical NFRs. The utility (U) of a representative NFR is positively affected by the level of her income flow(I), by the immediate access to farm-based LIF activities, the level of which is measured by r H and by the level of government services (like infrastructure and information centres), g. The income of a representative household is , where W is exogenous income (e.g. an annual wage) and is the value of property services (e.g., an annual reservation rent) which is monotonically increasing and concave in both . For the latter, see for example Tyrväinen and Miettinen (2000) who use data from dwellings in Finland and estimate a positive effect of amenity benefits on property prices applying a hedonic pricing method. In a different example, Hackl and Pruckner (1997) 
Obviously, this surplus increases the viability of the rural area and keeps NFRs from leaving. Note that in principal, the government may use the NFRs as a vehicle to reduce public expenditure required to finance g by levying on each of them a per-capita tax, up to a maximum level of . The shape of the functions P and u implies that Q is monotonically increasing and ) , ( r H g Q 6 strictly concave in both arguments. We additionally assume that
example, that the value of natural amenities for NFRs increases when access to these amenities increases (through infrastructure, extension services, access laws).
Participation Target and Cost-Minimising Policy Instruments
The ERP is aimed at the reduction of environmental pollution associated with intensive agricultural production. To satisfy this environmental goal, while choosing the policy instruments g and s, the government wishes to guarantee that at least (Cropper and Oates, 1992, Wu and Babcock, 1999) . At the first stage, the government set standards or targets and then, at the second stage, policy instruments are designed to achieve these targets. Here we focus on the second stage of policy making by assuming that the number of hectares targeted for the ERP has been identified already. The background for such a target area size may be related to ecological reasons (see Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000) or the result of a political process 8 which is exogenous to our analysis. It is implicitly assumed that the ERP is socially beneficial at the country level.
Since it is costly to raise governmental expenditure, the constraint must be binding at the optimal solution, i.e., The participation restriction in (8) allows us to express the direct payment, s, as a function of the governmental services g:
Complete differentiation of (8) 8 An example is the Ecological Main Structure in the Netherlands, for which the government explicitly set a goal of 100000 hectares to be managed by farmers (Oskam and Slangen, 1998) .
A graphical presentation of all ( s g, ) combinations that satisfy the participation restriction in (8) (hereafter, the participation restriction curve), for two levels of land area targeted for the ERP ( r H and r Ĥ ), is depicted in Figure 1 .
) ( For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all government services are purely non-rival and thus the cost of supplying them, c(g), is independent of the number of farmers. The cost function c(g) is assumed to be monotonically increasing and strictly convex, i.e., c The implementation costs of the voluntary ERP depends on the number of hectares of land targeted for the program,
9 Since r H is predetermined, these costs do not affect the qualitative results of the analysis and can therefore be suppressed for convenience. The total social costs of governmental expenditure are )]
where ρ is the marginal deadweight loss from distortionary taxes. The objective of a cost minimising government (hereafter Objective A) is to satisfy the participation restriction in (8a) at minimum public expenditure
Assuming an internal solution, the first order condition is 9 Implementation costs may be due to asymmetric information (e.g., Latacz-Lohmann, 1998; Burton, 1996) or monitoring and enforcement costs ( Wu and Babcock, 1999) . The impact of implementation costs on the relative efficiency of voluntary versus mandatory environmental regulations is analyzed in Wu and Babcock (1999) . Because voluntary programs (as the ERP here considered) provide more flexibility and reduce conflicts and formal legal procedures, they assume that the implementation costs of a voluntary program is lower than that of a mandatory program.
). ,
It can be easily verified that the second order condition for a minimum is also satisfied
Noting that (9a), the first order condition in (11) indicates that services should be provided by a cost minimising government at a level where their marginal costs, , equal their marginal benefits,
.
A graphical illustration of this result is also presented in Figure 1 . The curves labelled ) ( and ) and crosses it from above, (see point A', Figure 1 ). At point A', the slopes (in absolute value) of the former and the latter curves are given by the left hand side and the right hand side of (11a)', respectively. Note that the left hand side of (11a) decreases in g whereas the right hand side increases in g. Therefore, with 
Alternative Rural Objectives in Government Decision Making
Recall that both, farmers participating in the ERP and NFRs of the rural area under consideration, receive a surplus from the program. Thus, the ERP contributes not only to the goal of environmental protection, but also to the sustained vitality of the rural area under consideration. In this section we investigate the impacts of local, rural-level concerns in government decision making. Specifically, we consider three alternative governmental objective functions: a farmer oriented objective (G B ), a NFRs oriented objective (G C ) and an integrated rural policy objective (G   D   ) .
Farmers oriented objective
Originally, in the EU policy context (CAP), most attention with respect to (income) support in rural areas is given to farmers. A farmers' oriented objective of the ERP may therefore be associated with the 1992 CAP reform including the agri-environmental policy Regulation 2078/92, which aimed for farm income support while for the first time explicitly taking into account environmental concerns in the rural area. Under the farmers' oriented objective G B , the government wishes to achieve the target level r H at a ( combination that will maximise aggregate farmers' welfare, ignoring the social costs of public expenditure, E. Formally, . So, the first order condition in (13) is satisfied for all (
combination that satisfy the program constraint in (8). In other words, the farmers will be indifferent between all the combinations of direct payment and services that satisfy (8), including the pair ( ). In a graphical illustration (not presented here), the highest attainable iso-profit curve
the slope of which in the ( s g, ) axis is , would completely overlap the participation restriction curve in Figure 1 . Thus, for example, a government which maximises the weighted welfare of tax payers and farmers will choose the cost minimising solution, i.e.,
Non-farmer residents oriented objective
In many western countries, farmers maintain political power that is disproportionate to both their number and their importance to the economy. In contrast, rural NFRs are commonly not organised as an interest group and their political power does not reflect their number and economic contribution (Freshwater, 1997) . To an increasing extent, however, it becomes evident that for keeping the rural area viable, attention should be paid to NFRs. When NFRs start to leave rural areas, there will be less scope for other economic activities like shops and accommodation facilities within rural areas and villages. This will lower utility for the NFRs that are not in the position to leave but might also deteriorate the historical rural landscape and heritage, feasibility for tourism, etc. Under the NFRs oriented objective, G C , the government wishes to satisfy the participation constraint in (8) at a ( combination that will maximise aggregate NFRs' welfare, ignoring E:
where Q is given by (7). Since G C is independent of the direct payment s and Q is monotonically increasing in g, the optimal solution, ( , is a corner solution under which the constraint in (8) is satisfied with the highest possible level of g and the lowest possible level of s (point C, Figure 1 ). This conclusion holds even if some (but not all) of the per-household induced welfare increase, Q, is taxed in order to help financing governmental services g. In the extreme case, where Q is fully taxed and each NFR is tied up to his or her reservation utility, U 
≤

Integrated Rural Development oriented objective
Through the introduction of the new Rural Development Regulation 1257/99 and the expected efforts in the near future, the EU embraces both farm and non-farm developments as well as agrienvironmental measures. Although the regulation is co-financed from the CAP Guarantee Fund, considerable discretion but also financial burden is left to the individual member states and therefore, taxpayers. Also, due to the increasing urban society, urban support for rural programs may be required. "In Europe, urban people see rural areas as a part of their cultural and environmental heritage that they are willing to support" (Freshwater, 1997 10 The governmental expenditure is net of guaranteed EU funds aimed at supporting the specific program.
is the weight given to the NFRs' welfare.
11 The first order condition for an interior solution is under Objective D, services should be provided at a level where their marginal costs, , equal the weighted sum of their marginal benefits accruing to both, the farmers participating in the program (
) and the NFRs ( ).
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To compare between it is useful to calculate the value of the first order condition in (17) at point determined by (11): 
Implications and Concluding Remarks
The new Rural Development Regulation of the EU reflects the shift of attention within rural areas from agricultural production towards rural development. While agricultural production methods are required to be in accordance with environmental standards, rural areas also have to satisfy the growing demand by non-farm residents, both at a national and regional level, concerning outdoor recreation and tourism, nature and wildlife conservation, and landscape. This paper investigates the combined use of two policy instruments aimed at encouraging farmers to adopt environmentally beneficial practices and at increasing the provision of country-side amenities --direct payments, (s), and public services, (g).
Due to within-region spillover effects, the total agricultural area enrolled in the environmental-friendly regulation program (ERP) has positive impacts on the welfare of both, farmers and non-farmer residents (NFRs) of the rural area. The two policy instruments are not perfect substitutes: while direct payments affect only the total agricultural area enrolled in the ERP, the supply of government services also has direct positive spill-over effects on the welfare of the NFRs. Obviously, the government should choose s and g jointly, taking into account the interactions between the impacts of the two policy instruments on the welfare of farmers and nonfarmers residing in the rural area under consideration.
These instruments may be viewed as compensation given to farmers for the use of lessprofitable environmentally beneficial farming practices and at the same time as incentives to expand the provision of countryside amenities. Indeed, the analysis suggests that all hectares of a specific farm that participate in the program but the last marginal one, receives a surplus. The benefits from land enrolled in the ERP increases in the level of both policy instruments, in the target land area r H and in the per unit labour devoted for intensive agricultural activities
In addition to farmers, NFRs receive a surplus from the application of these instruments (especially g) too, which increases the viability of the rural area and keeps NFRs from leaving. In any case, governmental objectives will be served better if it has two policy instruments in its disposal instead of a single one. One implication of our analysis is that a combination of direct payments to farmers with the supply of local public services, is promising for rural policy development initiatives. By facilitating the demand and provision of LIF activities, local public services expand the economic pie of the rural area and may prove to be an important additional policy tool without the distortionary effects of conventional agricultural policy instruments like price support.
The specific choice of g and s is dependent on the target participation constraint and on the governmental objective. We found that more governmental services (g) should be provided when r H is increased, whereas the impact of such an increase on the optimal per hectare direct payment (s) is generally ambiguous. We also found that farmers are indifferent among all (g,s) pairs that satisfy a predetermined participation constraint and therefore farmers have no incentive to form a political lobby aiming at a specific combination of instruments. This result has an important policy implication. Being free from farmers' political pressure, the government has more flexibility to address national environmental goals and the concerns of the region's NFRs.
It is also shown that as long as the welfare gains of NFRs from the program is not fully taxed, they will prefer a combination of instruments under which the participation constraint is satisfied with the highest attainable level of governmental services and the lowest possible direct compensation payment per unit of land. Given the target participation level, substitution of s by g increases both, the value of the NFRs properties and the level of utility they draw from LIF activities at the region. Such a substitution is also likely to increase the welfare of consumers and tourists who reside out of the region (and are not explicitly considered in the current analysis) from the consumption of LIF activities supplied within the region. When the governmental objective addresses the social concerns of both, taxpayers and NFRs, the optimal level of public services will be lower than its highest attainable level, but higher than the cost minimising level.
The recognition that both farmers and NFRs play an important role in rural development issues has other implications that may deserve further study. For example, the demand for LIF activities (like farm-based recreation and landscape activities or the production of regional and "environmentally friendly" products indicated through labelling) by NFRs from within the region as well as from outside the region has not been dealt with explicitly. The same holds for the possible sources of asymmetric information and transaction costs that are related to initiatives such as the ERP suggested in this paper. The current analysis may serve as a starting point for such a more extended approach. 
